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German policy Sharif of Mecca

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Percy Toplis

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BerichtGeplaatst: 25 Feb 2011 14:47    Onderwerp: German policy Sharif of Mecca Reageer met quote

German policy toward the Sharif of Mecca, 1914-1916
by Donald M. McKale

The defeat of Turkey and Germany in World War I resulted in the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The victorious British and French protected their strategic interests in the Middle East by establishing a series of successor states and governments in the former empire's Arabicspeaking provinces. Although much is known about Britain's alliance with Ibn Ali Husayn, the sharif of Mecca and instigator of the Arab revolt in 1916 against the Turks, less is known about German policy toward the sharif.(1)

According to one German historian Berlin "devoted special pains to wooing" the sharif to its side, but it only succeeded for a while "in persuading him to take over propaganda for Germany in Mecca and Medina.... The circumstance that Britain, unlike Germany, was able to promise the Arabs complete independence, explains why British policy was more effective than German [policy] in Arabia." Moreover, Britain's conquest of Baghdad in March 1917 made its policy in Arabia more effective than Germany's. A close examination of German policy toward Husayn indicates that some Germans were concerned about the British interest in the sharif before the war began. However, contrary to its usual policy toward the Ottoman government, Berlin was unable to appreciate the Turkish position.(2)

The Ottoman Empire controlled most of the Arabian peninsula. Muslims acknowledged the sultan as caliph, the successor of the prophet Muhammad and the world leader of Islam. The Turks had appointed Husayn sharif of Mecca, traditionally one of the most privileged and respected positions of the empire, because the sharif was a descendant of Muhammad and the guardian of the holy places of Islam in Mecca and Medina. Husayn, honored and prestigious as he was, did not have the power to assert his complete independence from the Turks.

During the war, while the conflict between Constantinople and the sharif intensified, Berlin eagerly pushed the Turks to allow German contact with Husayn and even direct involvement in Hijaz, the region bordering the Red Sea in Arabia which he ruled. German objectives were confused and their policies toward the sharif were incoherent. At times Germany solicited the sharif's support, but in other instances it sought to use Hijaz to pursue its imperial interests in Africa.(3)

Part of Berlin's difficulty resulted from its failure to understand the sharif, his tense relations with the Turks over his rule in Hijaz, and his political goals. In June 1916, Husayn revolted against the Ottoman government after it refused to guarantee him a hereditary, autonomous amirate (territory under the jurisdiction of an Islamic prince) in Hijaz. The sharif wished to secure his position not only against Turkish interference but also against such rival Arab chieftains as Ibn Saud in northeastern Arabia. The Germans, like the Turks and the British, believed Husayn had greater ambitions. They thought that he sought to acquire the caliphate from the Ottoman sultan and to break completely from Turkish political and religious suzerainty.(4)

The British, who expected the defeat and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the war, wished to protect their dominant position in the Middle East and their major route to India by befriending and, they hoped, controlling Husayn. London assisted his revolt and even hinted at supporting him for the caliphate. The Germans had a strong interest in preserving the Ottoman Empire and they recognized Husayn's position. Consequently, Berlin usually deferred to Constantinople on Arab affairs, which cost both Germany and Turkey. Their call in November 1914 for a jihad, or Islamic holy war, against the Entente collapsed because Husayn, who controlled the shrines of the faith, did not join the jihad.(5)

The sharif had come to Germany's attention before the war. In 1908, while Husayn resided in Constantinople and shortly before the Turks appointed him sharif, Baron Max von Oppenheim, the German archaeologistspy attached to the German consulate-general in Cairo, met him briefly. Oppenheim learned that British officials in Cairo were interested in the Arabs. By September 1911, Oppenheim provided information that persuaded German emperor Wilhehn II that Lord Kitchener, the British resident in Cairo, hoped to take advantage of the then Turco-Italian war in Libya to establish an Arab caliphate under Anglo-Egyptian protection. Kitchener regarded the collapse of the Turks in their war with Italy as complete and the final disintegration and partition of the Ottoman Empire as inevitable. The Germans also knew about Kitchener's meeting in Cairo in the spring of 1912 (or 1913) with Husayn's second son, Abdullah, who not only met Kitchener at the Abdin palace of the khedive, Abbas Hilmi II, Turkey's pro-German German viceroy in Egypt and a friend of Oppenheim's, but also informed the Turks of the visit.(6)

In September 1914, shortly after outbreak of the war and during German negotiations with Turkey for the latter's entry into the conflict, a former Egyptian minister in Greece suggested to the German government that the Ottoman Empire could win Arab backing for an Ottoman attack on the Suez Canal if it appointed Husayn shaykh al-Islam. However, the German Foreign Ministry rejected the idea, although it already knew of Britain's interest in using the sharif as a counterweight to Turkey Oppenheim, who had returned to Berlin and headed the Foreign Ministry's holy war propaganda, observed that the British intended "to make the Great Sharif of Mecca independent of the caliphate in Constantinople and, if possible, make the Great Sharif himself caliph. A certain group of pan-Arabs has the same wish." Although Oppenheim admitted that the sharif "naturally had a certain influence on the Islamic world," he nevertheless believed Husayn was completely loyal to the Ottoman government and believed Germany needed only to strengthen the empire to attract Arab support. He thought Husayn was trustworthy because the sharif had once lived for an extended time in Constantinople and had recently assisted the Turks in settling conflicts with the Arab chieftains of Yemen and central Arabia.(7)

In the fall of 1914 German officials overestimated German and Turkish influence with Husayn. This resulted from their ignorance of the Arab situation. Although Oppenheim had traveled extensively before the war in Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, he had met Husayn only once, had almost no connections to the leading Arab chieftains, and had spent most of his political career as an attached in Egypt.(8)

After the Turkish entry into the war and proclamation of the jihad in November 1914, the Turks failed to persuade Husayn to send troops to the Ottoman 4th Army assembling in Syria to attack the Suez Canal. In December, the sharif arrested a German official, B. Moritz, the librarian of the Oriental seminar in Berlin whom the Foreign Ministry had dispatched to Arabia, and detained him briefly in the Red Sea port of Jeddah. Moritz, traveling in a region that was dangerous for non-Muslims even in peacetime, had attempted to establish a propaganda and intelligence center in the city. When he returned safely to Berlin in January 1915, Moritz reported to his superiors about the sharif's power in Hijaz, as well as Turkish inability to control the Arab leader and to realize the seriousness of the situation.(9)

The sharif was not taken very seriously by another German official, Curt Prufer, a political adviser and intelligence officer assigned by the Foreign Ministry to the Turkish 4th Army. Prufer received reports on Husayn from agents he had dispatched to Hijaz, including two Indian brothers with orders to spread anti-British propaganda among Indian and Egyptian pilgrims visiting Mecca and Medina. Prufer's information persuaded him that the sharif was pro-British. Nevertheless, he underestimated Husayn and thought that the Ottoman governor of Hijaz controlled the sharif. Prufer informed Oppenheim on 3 November 1914 that the sharif "is thoroughly English, but luckily powerless and in our hands."(10)

In February 1915, the British turned back the Turkish and German assault on the canal, which Husayn had refused to assist. The German consul in Damascus, adding to Moritz's warning, told Berlin that the Turks had failed to grasp the sharif's significance and his ties to the British and urged that more be done to change the situation. The consul's suggestion that Germany attempt to unite Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid, two powerful chieftains in northern Arabia and Iraq, behind the Turks as a counterweight to the sharif failed during the first half of 1915.(11)

In March 1915 as difficulties mounted, Arthur Zimmermann, the Foreign Ministry's undersecretary of state, expressed his concern about the "attitude of the Great Sharif of Mecca." He urged the German embassy in Constantinople to take measures, in association with the Turkish war minister Enver Pasha, "for the energetic combatting of English influence in Arabia." As a part of Berlin's growing awareness of the problem, the Foreign Ministry decided not only to reorganize and intensify German propaganda in the Ottoman Empire, but also to establish a method by which such propaganda could be spread more effectively throughout the Islamic world.(12)

The ministry sent Oppenheim to Constantinople. He investigated the Ottoman government's bitter dissatisfaction with Husayn, especially his previous refusal to join the jihad and to subordinate himself to the Turkish governor of Fujaz. Oppenheim learned that some Turkish circles wanted to replace the sharif. Oppenheim also met with Faysal, the sharif's third son, who had been sent to Constantinople to defend the sharif against intrigue and to secretly contact Arab nationalists in Syria about a possible revolt against the Turks. Faysal had spent four weeks in Damascus, where he found the situation confused and opinions divided. Some nationalists wanted him to assume leadership of an Arab revolt and alleged the assistance of Arab divisions in the Ottoman army. However, local military circles believed that Germany would soon win the war. These feelings resulted in part from the failure of the first two Anglo-French assaults on the Dardanelles in February and March to reduce the Ottoman defenses. The fortunes of war, which led the British to dispatch a task force to occupy the Gallipoli peninsula, encouraged Faysal to meet with Oppenheim.

Oppenheim received advice from Shaykh Saleh, a German ally from Tunisia, and Abbas Hilmil the ex-khedive of Egypt, exiled to Europe after Britain had deposed him in December 1914. Their advice led Oppenheim to conclude that -the mistrust toward the Amir Husayn from the Turkish government is unjustified." Germany, he thought, should enlist the sharif in aiding its propaganda campaign. "The Great Sharif," he declared to the Foreign Ministry, "is the unconditional lord of all institutions that are in contact with the pilgrimages, the holy cities, and all means of communication emanating from Hijaz."(13)

Oppenheim's meeting with Faysal buoyed his confidence in the sharif's loyalty to the Turks and Germans. Faysal called the accusation that his father had allied with Britain false, arguing that the large fees received by the sharif from pilgrims to Mecca would be threatened if the British received a foothold in Hijaz. Only if the Turks attempted to replace Husayn, said Faysal, would the sharif ally with Britain. When Faysal informed Oppenheim that the sharif did not wish Germany to intervene in Hijaz, the German replied that his country's sole objective was to strengthen the Turkish government and the caliphate.(14)

Although Oppenheim thought Faysal would welcome such an assurance, Faysal could not have liked what he heard about enhancing Ottoman power in Arabia. When Oppenheim attempted to persuade him to "make rebellions," Faysal asked what rebellions, and Oppenheim replied, "of Moslems against Christians ... everywhere - in India, Egypt, the Sudan, Java, Abyssinia, North Africa." Faysal resisted the argument that his father aid a revolt in India when Oppenheim confessed that Germany could not guarantee independence for India's Muslims. When the German suggested the sharif incite a rebellion in Egypt, Faysal rejected the idea by declaring that the "Egyptians were weather-cocks, with no political principle except dissatisfaction, and intent only on pleasure and money getting." Faysal also responded negatively to Oppenheim on the Sudan. The Sudanese, he declared, were "ignorant negroes, armed with broadbladed spears, bows, and shields. He who would try to stir them up against the English and their rifles and machine-guns is no good Moslem."(15)

Finally, Oppenheim, who never spoke to Faysal again after the meeting, succeeded in getting Faysal's agreement that the sharif would distribute German and Turkish propaganda in Mecca and Medina. Faysal conduded the pact mainly to help conceal his father's continuing secret negotiations with Britain, which were taking him closer to joining the war. In May 1915, when Faysal left Constantinople to return to Mecca, he ignored Enver Pasha's order that the sharif assist the Turks and Germans by providing a contingent of Bedouins for another Turkish attack on Egypt.(16)

The Germans, for their part, hailed Oppenheim's work. His negotiations with Faysal, conduded Hans von Wangenheim, the German ambassador in Constantinople, had not only saved the sharif but also contributed to improved relations between Turkey and Husayn. There is no doubt," he informed German chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, "that a replacement of the Great Sharif during this war would produce extraordinarily unpleasant consequences. Such an event would be exploited accordingly by our enemies in their interest. Deflecting this danger signified by itself a decisive success for us."(17)

But Wangenheim also warned Berlin not to undertake other activities in Hijaz, as Moritz and others had done before him. The reasons, said the ambassador, were that "these could eventually disrupt the actions of the Great Sharif" and that "nothing can happen in Hijaz without the knowledge and cooperation [of Husayn] and his people."(18)

Yet Wangenheim's superiors in the Foreign Ministry did not listen. He soon reported Constantinople's unhappiness about Germany's propaganda in Turkey and Enver's fear that the Germans were becoming too involved in Turkish-Arab relations. The Foreign Ministry ignored the opposition of Enver and Wangenheim and proposed to establish a German consulate in Jeddah. According to Enver, this would anger the sharif. He refused German proposals to bribe Husayn with large sums of money and told Wangenheim not to raise the issue again. Zimmermann reacted furiously, complaining that because Austria and Italy had consular officials there, "it is incomprehensible why the establishment of a German consulate should injure the feelings of the Great Sharif."(19)

Nevertheless, Enver prevailed by the summer of 1915, as the Germans were divided over the sharif. Wangenheim believed Husayn possessed considerable power and feared alienating him by dispatching a consul to Jeddah. Other officials, mostly those on propaganda and intelligence missions in Syria, Palestine, and the Sinai, flatly denounced Husayn and Faysal as unreliable, expressing skepticism about the sharif's promise to spread propaganda for Germany Still others dismissed the sharif as a politically negligible robber chief, too fanatical to work with the infidel British and easily removed by assassination if he became too difficult. A plan advanced at the embassy in Constantinople, in part by the new ambassador, Count Paul Wolff-Metternich (who possessed little training in Middle Eastern affairs), suggested that Germany should abandon its interest in Arabia altogether.(20)

During the autumn of 1915, when the Turks succeeded in holding the Allies at bay at Gallipoli, Germany became more uneasy about Husayn and the sharif's increasing hostility toward Germany. In October, the German consul in Damascus sent propaganda to Medina, despite Oppenheim's agreement with Husayn, using secret agents in towns along the Hijaz railroad and from there on to Mecca. At the same time, Oppenheim traveled into the Sinai and Hijaz disguised as a Bedouin. But when he arrived outside Medina, the sharif ordered him out of the area and he hastened back to Syria.(21)

The Turks in turn suspected Arab disloyalty. Although the information they had about secret Arab nationalist societies in the Ottoman army was true, they could not confirm it. Nevertheless, during the fall of 1915, numerous Arab notables were arrested and executed in Syria on charges of treason. Simultaneously, several nationalists pressed the British with an ultimatum either to support an independent Arab state as the sharif demanded or face the prospect of the Arab movement backing Germany and Turkey.(22)

During the first weeks of 1916, when the British and French completed the evacuation of Gallipoli and the Turks halted Britain's advance in Mesopotamia, the Germans pushed for an intensification of Turkish activity in Arabia. Their objective, however, was not to solicit the support of the sharif. Instead, the Foreign Ministry and the army reserve general staff in Berlin ignored the previous advice of Moritz, Wangenheim, and German agents in Palestine and Syria about not antagonizing Husayn because Berlin's activities in Africa overshadowed its caution toward the sharif. Berlin suggested that a German political mission travel along the Red Sea coast to Yemen to establish a major intelligence and propaganda base there. The Germans wanted to build a wireless station in Yemen from which they could conduct intelligence and military operations against the British in Abyssinia, Sudan, and Somaliland and further assist German troops in East Africa.(23)

Such German pressure could not have come at a worse time for Turkish-Arab relations as conflict between Constantinople and Husayn intensified. The Turks demanded that the sharif send a contingent of troops to the Ottoman army preparing for a second assault on the Suez Canal, but gave the sharif only vague promises about redressing his grievances in Hijaz. The Turks' lack of interest in negotiating with Husayn was encouraged by the German military mission in Constantinople, which did not view the situation in Hijaz as significant for the attack on the canal. Tension between Turks and Arabs increased when Djemal Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Syria and Palestine and commander of the 4th Army, unleashed a new wave of persecution against Arabs.(24)

At first the Turks opposed the idea of a German political mission to Yemen. But the matter was resolved by events in February 1916 and after. By mid February, Husayn and the British had completed their agreement for an alliance, and the sharif, angered by the Ottoman delay in addressing his complaints, continued preparations for an Arab revolt against Turkey. He sent Faysal to Syria to assist in organizing the rebellion there and simultaneously to see the Turks a final time.(25)

Faysal played a double game with the Germans. On 25 February he visited the German consul in Damascus, Dr. Loytved-Hardegg. On the one hand, Faysal warned the consul that the conflict between his father and the Turks could not be resolved, stressing their bitter differences. He accused Constantinople of failing to respect the privileges and authority Husayn possessed as sharif and of supplying weapons to Ibn Rashid, a tribal chief in northern Arabia with whom the sharif had a "blood feud." The sharif had also decreed that no foreigners or non-Muslims could enter Hijaz, but the Turks had violated the law by allowing the Emden crew and, Moritz to travel in the region. (The Australians had sunk the German ship, the Emden, and the ship's crew later sought to escape along the Arabian Red Sea coast.) That, declared Faysal, had led to harassment of the Germans by Husayn and his foflowers.

On the other hand, Faysal misled the German consul by appearing conciliatory toward the Turks, speaking highly of Enver Pasha, and stressing his father's good relations with the Ottoman government. Moreover, he maintained, Husayn had refused overtures from the British to join them despite every enticement from them to do so, "because as a descendant of the Prophet he [Husayn] could not become dependent on a Christian government.(26)

While Faysal spun his story in Damascus, Husayn also reaffirmed his loyalty to the Ottoman government. When asked by the Turks to assist in sending the German mission along the coast of Arabia to Africa, the sharif consented. But on 28 February 1916, the British received secret word from him about the mission. He informed them that with the mission's arrival in Mecca, he would contact the British and instruct them how to capture the Germans.(27)

Enver Pasha finally approved the German mission to Hijaz on 12 March, but ordered some 3,500 Ottoman troops to accompany it. He also directed the Germans to disguise themselves as Turks, since Enver wanted to avoid inflaming the already tense situation in Hijaz by bringing foreigners into the region. He also sought to pressure Husayn to commit Arab forces for the attack on the Suez Canal. For almost six weeks, Enver and Djemal Pasha held the German mission and Ottoman unit in Syria, while Constantinople negotiated with Husayn.

Constantinople's firmness made it clear to the sharif that the Turks would not support his aspirations in Hijaz. In early April 1916, he demanded that the Ottoman government give amnesty to Arab political prisoners, set up a decentralized Turkish regime in Syria and Iraq, recognize his rule in Hijaz as hereditary, and confirm its traditional status and privileges. Only when these were met, Husayn said, would he send the forces to the Ottoman army The Turks replied with an ultimatum and even threatened the safety of Faysal, who was still in Damascus. Husayn refused to give in.(28)

On 2 May 1916 the German mission and its escort left for Hijaz. The arrival of the unit in the region to reinforce the Turkish garrisons already there so upset Husayn that he was persuaded that the break with Turkey would have to be made soon. The German mission traveled by railroad into the desert, but on reaching the point where non-Muslims were allowed to go no further, it left the Turks and proceeded alone along the Red Sea coast. The Germans planned to link up with the Ottoman unit further down the coast and then march on to Yemen. As the Germans continued their journey, they heard that Bedouins had massacred another German group moving northward up the coast.(29)

A few days later, the German mission heading south for Yemen nearly met the same fate. On 5 June, as it reached the Arabian port city of Yanbu, the sharif's revolt exploded. Although the mission's leader and two other officers escaped, the others died at the hands of Bedouin attackers. The sharif's alarm over the arrival of the German and Turkish expedition, coupled with the Turkish rejection of his political demands, persuaded Idm to proclaim the revolt several weeks before he received a sufficient supply of arms promised him by the British since the beginning of 1916.30

The British-sponsored revolt led by Husayn and his sons did not end German interest in Husayn. Publicly, Berlin downplayed what had happened, but the uprising disturbed the Germans. The Foreign Ministry received reports from several of its missions in Europe, especially from Switzerland where the German legation had contacts with the Turkish community in exile there, that warned of the impact of the sharif's action.(31)

This may explain why the Germans encouraged the Turks, albeit unsuccessfully, to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward the Arabs. After the revolt began, Husayn remained in contact with Constantinople, in case he needed to change back to the Ottoman side in the war.(320

Finally, during the spring and summer of 1918, Djemal Pasha discussed the possibility of reconciling with the sharif by promising him the autonomy he had demanded in 1916 with German officials in Turkey Djemal believed that an agreement could be reached with Husayn without a settlement of the caliphate question. Nevertheless, Enver and other ministers in Constantinople did not support such concessions to the sharif.(33)

The war ended in the Middle East with the British triumph in Palestine and Syria, which Husayn's Arab forces assisted. But the importance of Husayn and the Arab revolt for the Middle East or for the war in general should not be exaggerated. It was the British, not the Arabs, who liberated the region from the Turks in 1917-18, but the British tie to Husayn proved useful in helping the British counter French claims in the area.(34)

Germany had arrived as a Great Power in the Middle East after Britain, France, and Russia. Had the Turks been more successful, not only with Husayn and the Arabs but also with the other peoples of the Ottoman Empire, Berlin might have made greater inroads with the Arabs. With its defeat, Germany's position in Turkey also disappeared, only to be revived in World War Ill by Arabs who resented British domination in the Middle East.(35)

(1) On the Anglo-Arab negotiations, which started in 1914, and on the revolt, see David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914-1922 (New York, 1989), 174-80, passim; Eli Kedourie, England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1974-1921 (London, 1956), 48-70; Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), 316-17. (2) Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York, 1967), 128-29. See also Donald M. McKale, "Germany and the Arab Question in the First World War," forthcoming in 1993 in Middle Eastern Studies; Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918 (Princeton, 1968). (3) For Germany's interests there before the war, see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich, 1871-1918 (Gottingen, 1983), 196; Imanuel Geiss, Das Deutsche Reich und die Vorgeschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs (Munich, 1978), 121; Norman Rich, Friedrich von Holstein: Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and Wiliam II (Cambridge, 1965), 2.488-90; Andreas Hillgruber, Germany and the Two World Wars, trans. William C. Kirby (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 18; Konrad H. Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor. Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven, 1973),148-84. (4) C. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism (Urbana, 1973),40; Kedourie, England and the Middle East, 48-57. (5) On the frequent German deference to Turkey, see Ulrich Trumpener, "Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire," in The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Marian Kent (London, 1984),12740. (6) "Arab Bulletin," no. 77 (27 January 1918), 26, Public Records Office, London, Foreign Office Series (hereafter FOS) 882 (Arab Bureau Papers), vol, 27; Robert Lacy, The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Sa'ud (New York, 1981),85; State Secretary of the Gennan Foreign Ministry Alfred von Kiderlen-Wachter to Wilhelm II, 24 September 1911, in Die Grope Politik der Europdischen Kabinette, 1877-1914. Sammlung der Diplomatischen Akten des Auswartigen Ands, ed. Johannes Lepsius et al. (Berlin, 1926), vol. 30, pt. 1, 50-51; Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, 61-68; Wilhelm Treue, "Max Freiheff von Oppenheim-Der Archaologe und die Politik," Historische Zeitschrift 209 (1969): 50.([ (7) Baron Max von Oppenheim, "Zu Telegram 425 aus Athen vom 13. September," 14 September 1914, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. (hereafter Nara)/microcopy T-137 (German Foreign Ministry Archives, 1867-1920)/reel 22/frames 0786-87; Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, 6-10; Albert Graf von Quadt (German minister in Athens) to German Foreign Ministry, 13 September 1914, NARA/T-137/22/0785. (8) See Treue, "Max Freiherr von Oppenheim," 37-59; Thomas W. Kramer, Deutsch-agyptische Beziehungen in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart (Tubingen, 1974), 60-61; R. L. Melka, "Max Freiherr von Oppenheim: Sixty Years of Scholarship and Political Intrigue in the Middle East," Middle Eastern Studies 9 (1973): 81-93. (9) See Moritz's reports to the Foreign Ministry, 8 and 16 January 1915, NARA/T-137/23/0738-40, 0742-50. (10) See his reports to Oppenheim of 3 November and 31 December 1914, NARA/T-137/23/0213-14, 0635; Donald M. McKale, Curt Prufer: German Diplomat from the Kaiser to Hitler (Kent, Ohio, 1988), 32-33. (11) Alois Musil's report, 26 April 1916, NARA/T-137/139/00142-64; and Wilheim Padel (Damascus consul) to Wangenheim, 20 February 1915, NARA/T-137/138/ 00626-27. See, Robin Bidwell, Travellers in Arabia (London, 1976),156. (12) Zimmennann to German embassy, Constantinople, 28 March 1915, NARA/T-137/138/00637. (13) Oppenheim, memo, 15 May 1915, NARA/T-120 (Records of the German Foreign Ministry Received by the State Department)/4951/L367241-56, McKale, "Germany and the Arab Question'; A. L. Macfie, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 (London, 1989), 57; Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, 4-37. (14) Oppenheim, memo, 15 May l9l5, NARA/T-120/4951/l367241-56. (15) "Arab Bulletin," no. 42 (15 February 1917), 79-80, FOS 882, vol. 26. (16) Oppenheim, memo, 15 May l9l5, NARA/T-120/495'/l367250-52. (17) Wangenheim to Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg (German chancellor), 22 May 1915, NARA/T-120/4951/L367234-38. (18) lbid. (19) Zimmermann to German embassy in Constantinople, 4 May 1915, NARA/T-120/4951/L366992-93; Frank G. Weber, Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance, 1914-1918 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1970), 183; Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg, 2 April 1915, NARA/T-137/24/0160-61; Otto von Wesendonck, G. A.," (n.d. [April 19151); Wangenheim to Foreign Ministry, 15 May 1915, NARA/T-120/4951/L366-67, L367134. (20) Weber, Eagles on the Cresent, 183; Foreign Ministry to German embassy in Constantinople, 11 May 1915, NARA/T-137/24/0400, Wangenheim to Foreign Ministry, 5 May 1915, NARA/T-120/4951/L367030-31; McKale, "Germany and the Arab Question." (21) Ronald Storrs, memo, 12 November 1915, FOS 882, vol. 12, doe. no. KH/15/14. See also the German consul in Haifa and Damascus, Dr. Loytved-Hardegg, to Wangenheim, 8 October 1915, NARA/T-149 (American Comn-dttee for the Study of War Documents, German Foreign Ministry Archives, post 1914)/365/00091. (22) Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 173-87, 218-19; Isaiah Friedrnan, The Question of Palestine, 1914-1918: British-Jewish-Arab Relations (New York, 1973), 69-70; Kedourie, England and the Middle East, 63. (23) Wesendonek, memo, 6 March 1916, NARA/T-137/25/0243. (24) Jehuda L. Wallach, Anatomie einer Militarhilfe.' Die preupisch-deutschen Militarmissionen in der Turkei, 7835-1919 (Diisseldorf, 1976), 218; Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, 30-35. (25) Note "Abschrift: Telegramm des Militarattaches Pera Nr. 2333 vom 11,3 [1916]" to the army's reserve general staff, NARA/T-137/25/0277; Wesendonck, "G. A.," 12 March 1916, NARA/T-120/4952/L368130-31. (26) Loytved-Hardegg to Wolff-metternich, 26 February 1916, NARA/T-137/25/0303-0305. (27) Gilbert Clayton to the Governor General, Khartoum, 28 February 1916, FOS 882,12, KH/16/4. (28) Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, 34-35. (29) See Dudley Ridout (general officer commanding the troops, straits settlements) to War Office, London, 11 October 1916, FOS 372 (Threaties)/piece no. 8641/file no. 257971; Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, 37; Teports of the leader of the German mission to Yemen, Major Othmar von Stotzingen, 15 and 28 April, 5 May 1916, in German embassy in Constantinople to the army's reserve general staff in Berlin, 15 May 1916, NARA/T-137/139/00210-16. (30) "Arab Bulletin," no. 52 (n.d. [end of May 19171), 249, FOS 882, vol. 26; Lawrence James, Lawrence of Arabia: The Golden Warrior (London, 1990), 111. (31) Gisbert von Romberg (German minister in Bern) to Bethmann Hollweg, 27 July, 3 August, 10 October 1916, and 4 January 1917, NARA/T-149/403/00298-302, 00352-53, 00523-26, and 0714-17, respectively. Also note German embassy Madrid to Foreign Ministry, 28 June 1916; Wesendonck's marginalia in embassy to Foreign Ministry, 26 July 1916, NARA/T-120/4952/L368322-23, L368343-44. (320 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 220-21; Kedourie, England and the Middle East, 107; Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 69-107. (33) Count Bernstorff, Memoirs of Count Bernstorff, trans. Eric Sutton (New York, 1936), 213-15. For German activity among Arabs in Mesopotamia and Iraq in 1917-18, see McKale, "Germany and the Arab Question." (34) Macfie, The Eastern Question, 60-63. (35) Elie Kedourie, "Great Britain, the Other Powers, and the Middle East before and after World War I," in The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1919-1939, ed. Uriel Dann (New York, 1988),3; Hourani, History of the Arab Peoples, 320.

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Kaiser Wilhelm sought to use jihad to win first world war

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