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The Fight for Oil: Britain in Persia, 1919

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The Fight for Oil: Britain in Persia, 1919
Donald Ewalt, 31 August 1981

British-Russian rivalry over the control of Persia had, by the beginning of the twentieth century, a long history. Donald Ewalt shows how this conflict was greatly intensified by the discovery of oil and a growing realisation of its importance.

The important role that oil played in shaping British foreign policy in the Middle East at the close of the Great War has come to light in several recent historical works. These studies examine Britain's newly-developed awareness of the importance of oil almost exclusively, however, in terms of Mesopotamia and the oil potential of Mosul. Historians have ignored whether oil considerations (other than the oil in southwest Persia) might not have played a significant role in the development of the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919. A more thorough examination of the evidence indicates that the agreement was a product of Great Britain's diplomatic preoccupation with the control of future oil supplies. Lord Curzon, architect of the agreement, spearheaded Britain's attempt to gain control of the oil reserves of the Middle East. Likewise, a number of other countries, led by the United States, opposed the Anglo-Persian Agreement primarily because of their desire to forestall an English oil monopoly.

Great Britain's interest in Persia began early in the nineteenth century. This interest led to friction with Russia, Persia's northern neighbour. The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 helped to stabilize nearly a century of intermittent conflict between them. This agreement provided for a Russian sphere of influence in northern Persia while a neutral zone separated it from Britain's sphere of influence in south-eastern Persia. For Russia, Persia represented an area for future territorial annexation. Great Britain, on the other hand, sought no territory in Persia. Rather, its primary concern was not its commercial interests, or oil fields (which were discovered two years later), but the military security of India, its jewel in the East.

By 1915, however, Great Britain's concerns in Persia had changed. By 1910 oil was discovered in south-western Persia. Three years later the British Admiralty converted its main fuel from coal to nil. Soon after, the British government purchased, primarily on the initiative of Winston Churchill, 51 per cent of the stock in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The company owned an oil concession for all of Persia, with the exception of the five northern provinces which were in the Russian sphere of influence, The Constantinople Agreement of 1915 is evidence of Britain's change in policy regarding the importance of Persia. By this agreement Russia gained control of the Bosporus and the Dardenelles Straits, the sole waterways from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. Britain incorporated most of the so-called Persian 'neutral zone', previously separating British and Russian spheres of influence, into its own sphere. Although Great Britain wanted to protect and to promote its commercial interests, safeguarding India and the very valuable oil resources in southern Persia were the primary concerns.

The collapse of Tsarist Russia in 1917 during the First World War was a major setback to the Entente cause in Europe and the Middle East. Furthermore, India now appeared more vulnerable to a combined German-Turkish offensive via the Caucasus. The British War Office reacted quickly. In February 1918 they delegated Major-General Dunsterville and a small body of British officers and NCOs the task of recreating the military front between Turkey and India, previously provided by the Tsar's troops. Although insuring the defence of India was a primary concern, an equally important task of the Dunsterforce or 'Hush-Hush force', as it was called in Mesopotamia, was the capture of Baku and its enormous oil fields. The Dunsterforce succeeded in temporarily capturing Baku in May 1918. However, British forces were too few and local troop levies were unreliable. It was impossible to prepare adequate defence measures and Turkish forces soon compelled the British to retreat to Persia. After Turkey signed the Armistice of Mudros on November 30th, 1918, British forces secured control of Baku in November 1918. By December British forces protecting the Baku-to-Batum railway and pipeline numbered more than a spanision. According to Heinrich Hassmann, an expert on oil in the Soviet Union, the British rescinded the Bolsheviks' 'expropriation of the oil industry and reinstated the former property owners'. British engineers immediately began repairing the pumping stations and railway by which Baku oil was transported.

British forces scattered throughout Persia and the Caucasus coupled with the demise of Russian military influence in the area allowed British policy makers, in particular Lord Curzon, to consider policies and actions previously unthinkable. The Eastern Committee' met on numerous occasions in December 1918 to deliberate what Britain's future policy regarding Persia, the new Transcaucasian Republics, and Russia would be. Two views concerning the future role of British troops in Transcaucasia emerged in the Eastern Committee's meetings. Lord Curzon chaired this committee. He was an unabashed imperialist and argued for a stronger British presence in the Area. A.J. Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, and Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, were opposed to maintaining Ė let alone strengthening Ė British troop commitments. Curzon reminded them that the now defunct Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 had not adequately safeguarded India. India must now receive adequate protection, he explained; besides, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia were anti-Bolshevik and anti-Russian. Consequently, Britain should support their nationalistic aspirations which would have the effect of making Batum a free port on the Black Sea. He incidentally noted that northern Persia could be opened up to commercial interests and, of course, there were the petroleum resources of Baku. Curzon ended by saying that the British had a moral responsibility to help the fledgling republics to establish themselves. Montagu protested that Britain's military presence did not safeguard India. Russian troops presented no danger to India, but Bolshevik propaganda most certainly abetted social tensions developing in India. He further queried why Britain should assume moral responsibility for establishing the Transcaucasian Republics. Lord Robert Cecil, Balfour's deputy, answered simply Ė because of the oil in Baku. Curzon's plea that Britain had a moral responsibility did not deceive Balfour. He accurately assessed the situation when he remarked, 'I should say we are not going to send all our money and men in civilizing a few people who do not want to be civilized. We will protect Batum, Baku, the railway between them, and the pipeline.' Balfour and Montagu were critical, but they failed to present a viable alternative to Curzon's policy. So despite the sometimes strong and outspoken opposition, the Eastern Committee deferred to Curzon. Consequently, by December 16th, 1918, the Committee agreed that it wanted strong independent states in the Caucasus, but disagreed over who should be responsible for seeing that this occurred.

After deciding what British policy would be in the Caucasus, the Eastern Committee directed its attention to Persia. Curzon secured the consent of his colleagues to enter into negotiations with Persia on December 18th, 1918. The following day the Foreign Office prepared a memo on the, 'policy of H. M. G. towards Persia at the Peace Conference'. It proposed that Britain should aim for a mandate over Persia. To say that the Committee generally favoured the policy recommended by the Chairman is misleading. In a letter dated January 6th, 1919, Montagu, a constant critic of Curzon's Middle East policies, wrote, 'I really feel so alarmed about some aspects of the Eastern Affairs that I am compelled to write to you'. He indicated that several members of the Eastern Committee were absent or left the meeting early, 'and therefore the Committee consisted of the Chairman; and the Chairman, of course, not unnaturally agreed with the Chairman'. Sir Edwin, doubted if he could find funds in India for any projects in Persia. Whatever opposition there had been in the Eastern Committee, Lord Curzon succeeded in at least placating them, even though he was unable to achieve their full support.

On August 9th, 1919, Lord Curzon, now the Acting Foreign Secretary, circulated a memo informing all Cabinet members that Great Britain had consummated an agreement with Persia. This agreement, he wrote, represented the culmination of nine months of negotiations between His Majesty's government and Vossuq al-Dawlah, the Persian Prime Minister, and two other Cabinet members. Furthermore, he continued, it was not Britain who had initiated the idea. Rather, the Persian Cabinet members had 'decided of their own free will to ask us to assist Persia in the rehabilitation of her fortunes'. As to why Britain was interested in helping Persia, Curzon noted that Persia's geographical position was of prime importance. Britain did not desire that Persia should become 'a hotbed of misrule' between its new protectorate in Mesopotamia and India. There was still a danger of the Bolsheviks overrunning Persia and perhaps most important were Persia's 'great assets in the shape of oil fields ... and which give us [Britain] a commanding interest in that part of the world'. To accomplish this, the Foreign Office and the India Office would collaborate, providing necessary assistance 'without assuming direct control over Persian administration'. Finally, Persia would not 'be converted in any sense into a British protectorate'.

The agreement itself seemed innocuous enough. The main points were as follows: first, Great Britain pledged 'to respect absolutely the independence and integrity of Persia'; second, Britain would supply, at Persia's expense, expert advisers as needed by the administration; further, Britain would supply, also at Persia's expense, whatever military officers and equipment were needed, third, to help finance the changes, Britain agreed to lend Persia £2,000,000 to be repaid at 7 per cent interest by means indicated in the agreement; fourth, Britain agreed to a tariff revision, ostensibly on Persia's behalf, and to encourage railway construction. Two letters from Sir Percy Cox, the British Ambassador to Persia, to Vossuq al-Dawlah were supplementary to the text of this agreement. These letters committed Great Britain to a revision of treaties in force between the two nations; Persian compensation for material damages of other belligerents on its soil; and 'The rectification of the frontier of Persia at points where it is agreed upon by the parties to be justifiable'. Great Britain also relinquished the cost of maintaining British troops in Persia and Persia would not claim compensation for any damages caused by their presence.

Notwithstanding the British government's strong statements of concern for Persia's future welfare and prosperity, the Anglo-Persian Agreement evoked a negative response from many quarters. Richard Cottam, in his classic study on Persian Nationalism, discovered that all twenty-six tabloid newspapers in Tehran, except the Persian government's official publication the Raad, were opposed to the agreement. Persian Nationalists, that is, supporters of the Persian Constitution and frequent opponents of the Shah, were the most vociferous opponents of the agreement. Had they been convinced of Great Britain's sincerity, the Majlis (Persian Parliament) might have ratified the agreement. As it was, British troops were still in Persia even though the war was over. Why were they still on Persian soil? Moreover, rumours abounded that the British had bribed Vossuq al-Dawlah and his two minions to negotiate the agreement. This was in fact the case. Using the British controlled Imperial Bank of Persia, the Foreign Office paid to Sarem al-Dawlah and Prince Firouz 100,000 tomans each. The Prime Minister received 200,000 tomans. Finally, the Nationalists saw Britain as an imperialistic power trying to capitalize on Russia's weakness. The struggling Bolshevik government decried the agreement. However, its more immediate concern was to consolidate its own position in central Russia and then to secure the release of the three newly created republics from British domination in the Caucasus. The French government and press attacked the agreement at length. A French newspaper, Echo de Paris , declared, 'If these various stipulations don't constitute a protectorate, in the fullest sense of the words, words no longer have any meaning'. Several American newspapers also criticized the agreement, but less severely.

The well-paid Persian ministers who negotiated the Anglo-Persian Agreement attempted to counter the barrage of opposition to it by publishing an article in the Raad in August that stated, 'America, the only government able to assist Persia, abandoned her'. The Raad adopted this stratagem because some, 'newspapers denounce treaty, but suggested that a similar treaty be made with America if possible'. This method failed to diminish criticism of the agreement in Persia; it served, however, to bring the United States government actively into the situation. The United States State Department quickly understood why the British Foreign Secretary Balfour did not want the Persian delegation coming before the Council of Foreign Ministers at the Versailles Peace Conference. The Foreign Office was simultaneously conducting secret negotiations in Tehran. Realizing this, Robert Lansing, the United States Secretary of State, in a telegram dated August 20th, sent to John W. Davis, the American Ambassador to Great Britain, stated, 'It now appears ... Great Britain was engaged in secret negotiation to gain at least economic control of Persia'. Lord Curzon had met the previous day (August 18th) with Ambassador Davis. Curzon talked about French hostility to the agreement and had the temerity to ask for American assistance and hoped that the United States would 'preserve a friendly attitude'. Lansing, reacting to Curzon's request, said, 'we will not do anything to encourage such secret negotiation or to assist in allaying the suspicions and dissatisfaction which we share as to an agreement negotiated in this manner'. Secretary Lansing then prepared a special communique to be published in the newspapers in Tehran with copies to be distributed, during the evening of September 9th, throughout the city. The communique denied reports that the United States had ever withheld aid from Persia. It also asserted that the United States "often tried to obtain a hearing for Persian delegates before the Peace Conference... but the new treaty probably explains the reason' they never received an audience. The United States did request Ė though not strongly Ė that the Persian delegation should be granted a hearing. The question of Persian representation arose on three occasions and 'was never considered in a sustained discussion'.

Lord Curzon responded, in a letter of September 12th, to John W. Davis, that the official United States response in local Persian newspapers 'would undoubtedly be regarded locally, and indeed was regarded, as a challenge to the Anglo-Persian agreement of an unfriendly and almost a hostile character'. In this same letter, Curzon counterattacked by asserting that 'the agreement possesses a striking resemblance in many particulars to that which the American government had [sic] lately been negotiating with the Liberian government as the best friend of Liberia'. Curzon hoped that the United States government, realizing that he had informed President Woodrow Wilson's aide, Colonel House, of the Anglo-Persian negotiations, would soon issue a retraction. Ambassador Davis communicated the United States strong reply to the Foreign Office. The State Department denied the validity of Curzon's logic and amply demonstrated the dissimilarity between the two respective agreements. Furthermore, Colonel House recalled 'a casual conversation with Lord Curzon', but stated that, 'it did not occur to him that he was being formally approached as the official channel of communication with the United States Government in this instance'. Lastly, the State Department wrote it was 'not in a position ... to give approval to the Anglo-Russian agreement'. Davis, in an accompanying personal letter to Curzon, expressed a willingness to discuss any points in detail. The New York Times printed the entire diplomatic exchange in several issues between August 30th and December 17th. In commenting on the correspondence, The New York Times described the State Department's reply as 'one of the sharpest and most caustic notes sent to the London Foreign Office in recent years'.

The State Department opposed the Anglo-Persian Agreement primarily for economic reasons. British political domination of Persia was not mentioned. Ambassador Davis in a conversation with Lord Curzon on October 14th, reported 'that there was a growing feeling, particularly among American oil interests that there was some design to discriminate against them in the Near East'. Curzon agreed, adding, 'that that was the sordid side of the situation and while oil was supposed to calm troubled waters it had no such effect on land'. However, the intensity of the State Department response to the agreement cannot be fully explained by indignation over the secrecy involved or apprehension concerning the future of oil resources merely in Persia. Following the war Lord Curzon had remarked, 'The Allies floated to victory on a wave of oil'. He neglected to mention that during the latter part of the war, oil from the United States provided 80 per cent of this mighty wave. Between 1917-20 two distressing ideas gained credence among oil experts and policy makers in Washington. Several experts had recently forecast that the United States would exhaust its oil resources within a decade or two. Coincidently, the United States petroleum industry, in particular Standard Oil of New Jersey, warned that Great Britain sought to control the world's most promising sources of oil. Standard Oil strongly urged the State Department to steadfastly uphold the principle of an Open-Door policy regarding the acquisition and exploitation of mineral resources. The State Department responded quickly to the oil industry's cries that it was being systematically discriminated against in acquiring foreign oil resources. In the summer of 1919 the State Department instructed American counsellors and diplomatic officials to assist and 'give special attention to helping American interests in obtaining oil properties abroad'.

The United States was involved in a bitter contest for control of the world's most promising oil fields. The locus of this conflict was in the Middle East and primarily with Great Britain. It should be remembered that, as one writer of the time put it, 'Of all the spoils of war, Turkey was among the richest'. The tentative spanisions of the 'spoils' had begun with the Constantinople Agreement in 1915, shortly after the Entente and the Central Powers began to butcher each other in Europe. In the following year the Sykes-Picot agreement further delineated areas of British and French control in Asiatic Turkey. There was to be a French zone in Syria, a British zone south of Syria covering part of Mesopotamia, and an international zone including part of Palestine. Lloyd George was unhappy with the Sykes-Picot agreement and waited for an opportunity to modify it. The opportune moment came in December 1918, when Georges Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister, needed British support for French demands in Europe. Clemenceau agreed to make concessions from France's zone to insure a larger Palestine and ceded control of the potentially rich oil bearing regions in Mosul to the British zone in Mesopotamia. In return, Clemenceau received a 25 per cent share in the oil of Mosul for France. Lloyd George, upon encountering difficulties with Clemenceau over British railway and pipeline crossings from Mosul to Tripoli, withdrew on May 21st, 1919, and further oil negotiations stopped. Lloyd George's stand on Syria perturbed Clemenceau, convincing him that 1egitimate French interests there were being violated. He believed that Lloyd George was attempting to oust the French from Syria and deprive them of their share in the oil of Mesopotamia.

The State Department was well aware of the British and French negotiations. Leland Summers, member of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, asked Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith, Head of the Economic Section of the British delegation, on May 13th, 1919, for any information concerning the Anglo-French agreement and specifically those aspects dealing with 'oil properties throughout the Orient'. Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith replied that conversations had taken place, but that he was unaware of any final agreement. On May 23rd, Summers again inquired, explaining that it would be 'very desirable if you give us some idea of the negotiations', so that 'American interests are not excluded from participation'. But, as mentioned earlier, talks concerning oil in Mesopotamia had already fallen through. Lord Curzon advised Balfour on July 8th that he should inform Summers the talks were off, even though they were not. Negotiations concerning Rumania's oil fields continued into August before they came Work on a section of oil pipeline in Persia, 1917 to an abrupt halt.

Talks concerning British and French oil co-operation did not resume until December 1919. During the interval, Senator Berenger, CommissionerGeneral of Petroleum Products in France, had prepared a memorandum for Clemenceau analyzing recent British Policy in the Middle East. Senator Berenger dealt at length with the 'great activities displayed by Great Britain for securing control over oilfields in Asiatic countries', in order to rid herself of dependence on United States oil supplies. Evidence of this, Berenger noted, displayed itself in the secret Anglo-Persian agreement, concluded without the knowledge of the United States or of any European country. Second, he described as autocratic Britain's handling of the three new Caucasian republics. He argued that Great Britain was trying to create a 'British petroleum interest extending from Egypt to Burmah and from Circassia to the Persian Gulf which is intended to be an offset to the great American petroleum interests'. Berenger described this policy as 'justified', adding that France should acquiesce if she received 'a legitimate share in oil enterprises'. Sir Hamar Greenwood, Minister in Charge of Petroleum Affairs, and Senator Berenger arrived at a new accord, the terms of which were spelled out in the San Remo agreement of April 1920.

The San Remo agreement represented the culmination of the British government's attempt to control future world oil production. There had been a definitive plan for British monopolisation of the world's most promising oil fields. Further, this plan was instrumental in shaping Britain's Middle East policy. In an elaborate memorandum entitled 'Petroleum Situation in the British Empire', Admiral Edmund Slade, one of the directors of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, had outlined, among other things, how to block the application of the Open-Door principle. His memorandum received serious consideration from the Cabinet. This memo suggested that they

encourage and assist British Companies to obtain control of as much oil lands in foreign countries as possible, with the stipulation (to prevent control being obtained by foreign interests) that the oil produced shall only be sold to nr through British oil distributing companies. These oil lands can be developed to assist to provide our requirements in peace whilst our own resources in British territory can be conserved for war.

This memorandum was instrumental in and provided the impetus for the hectic military march for control of Mosul in October 1918. Lord Curzon, in his capacity as chairman of the Eastern Committee, pressed Lloyd George to make sure Britain occupied Mosul.

Significantly, Lord Curzon began working on the Anglo-Persian agreement the following month. The official reasons for the agreement were stated earlier. Most historians believe that the agreement would have made Persia a British protectorate, thereby safeguarding Britain's oil interests in the south, India to the east, and the anticipated control of Mesopotamia to the west. A 'veiled' protectorate wais probably not necessary to secure these goals. The areas under Britain's suzerainty in 1915, when she received the greater portion of the 'neutral zone' in Persia, would, most likely, have provided the necessary security. Lord Curzon saw a greater vision contained in the agreement's unstated objectives. It included the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and its efforts to secure control, and exploit the oil in Persia's five northern provinces. British oil experts knew that the oil in northern Persia was only profitable if it could be shipped overland to the Black Sea. The only other way to transport the oil was a prohibitively expensive route over the Zagros Mountains to the Gulf. The agreement allowed the British to provide moral and military support to the anti-Bolshevik forces under the White Russian, General Deniken. The British Cabinet had decided in August 1919, that it would lend most of its support to Deniken. The most daring aspect of the agreement was Britain's willingness to work for 'the rectification of the frontier of Persia at points where it is agreed upon by the parties to be justifiable'. Curzon attempted to implement this aspect of the treaty. Oliver Wardrop, British High Commissioner for Transcaucasia, asked Curzon in December 1919, if British representatives should attend negotiations on the 'rectification of frontiers and proposed confederation of Persia and Azerbaijan'. Curzon replied that British representatives should not attend. A Foreign Office memorandum, circulated to the Cabinet in late December 1919, stated:

in the absence of any more definite expression of local opinion in favour of such a course, it would be difficult for His Majesty's Government to consent to the reincorporation of the Republic of Azerbaijan, carrying with it of course Baku and its vast oil resources in Persia.

The Persian government believed the British would remain. A Persian mission went to Baku to negotiate commercial treaties. There were allegations that secret negotiations occurred to bring the Baku oil industry into the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The Soviets, believing this to be the case, executed the Azerbaijan government's Minister for Industry and Mines, Tlekhas, for attempting 'the cession of Baku oil to the British Imperialists'. The troops of a resurgent Soviet Russia put a stop to these grandiose plans. The Anglo-Persian Agreernent was dead by May 1920, the victim of the Soviet conquest of Azerbaijan and subsequent troop landings in northern Persia coupled with the retreat of British troops. The British were humiliated, and the Persian government was discredited. On February 21st, 1921, a coup d'ťtat organized by Seyyid Zia al-Tabatabai and Colonel Reza Khan of the Persian Cossacks overthrew it. The new government quickly assessed the situation and acted. On February 26th it signed a Treaty of Friendship with Soviet Russia. Then it denounced the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919.

The Anglo-Persian Agreement was more than an outgrowth of Lord Curzon's concern for Persia and the protection of India. In his eyes the Agreement represented the implementation of a multi-faceted policy, The absence of Russian influence, plus the recognized strategic and economic importance of oil allowed Curzon to act. Gaining control of the oil reserves in northern Persia and Baku were part of a larger policy that had as its goal British control of potential oil bearing lands in foreign countries. Curzon wanted to stabilize the new Caucasian republics and secure control of the oil in Baku by stationing additional British troops there. In his estimation, the importance of oil warranted such action. The Eastern Committee disagreed and refused to approve the dispatch of additional troops for the area. Curzon attempted to circumvent this refusal with a strategem that was both audacious and ingenious. He sought to incorporate the Republic of Azerbaijan (and the oil fields of Baku) into Persia. As a part of Persia, the former republic would qualify for additional military protection once the Anglo-Persian Agreement was ratified.

This plan failed. The Republic of Azerbaijan wanted British protection, but not by forfeiting its newly-acquired independence. The Persian politicians wanted the Agreement's benefits, but the Nationalists opposed Persia becoming a British protectorate. The United States government support of the Nationalists thwarted attempts to convene the Majlis to ratify the Agreement. And the Bolshevik landing in northern Persia ultimately killed any hope of the Agreement's ratification.

Consequently, as soon as the Foreign Office announced the Agreement, it provided the American oil industry and the State Department with another example of the British Government's intent to control foreign oil reserves. Within this context, the vigorous opposition of the State Department to the Anglo-Persian Agreement is more easily understood. Standard Oil of New Jersey capitalised on the State Department's support of the Nationalists. The Majlis awarded Standard Oil the oil concession for the five northern provinces in Persia. Standard Oil later used this concession to gain an entry into the oil negotiations surrounding Mesopotamia. What began as an idea to control the world's untapped oil reserves ultimately evolved into a Middle East oil cartel in which British, American, and French oil companies shared.

Notes on Further Reading:
Richard Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations , 1917-1921 , vol. 2: Britain and the Russian Civil War . vol. 3: The Anglo-Soviet Accord (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968); E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 , First Series, vol. 3 (London, 1948); Marian Kent, Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil 1900-1920 (New York: Harper and Row, 1976); Marian Jack, 'The Purchase of the British Government's Shares in the British Petroleum Company 1912-1914", Past and Present 39 (April 1968); S. A. Cohen, 'The Genesis of the British Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914', Middle Eastern Studies 12 (May 1976); V. H. Rothwell, 'Mesopotamia in British War Aims, 1914-1918', The Historical Journal 13 (1970); Helmut Mejcher, 'Oil and British Policy Towards Mesopotamia, 1914-1918', Middle Eastern Studies 13 (October 1973) and 'British Middle East Policy, 1917-1921, The Interdepartmental Levels', Journal of Contemporary History 7 (October 1973)

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